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A Review of "Choice of Law and Choice of Forum in Trans-
national Transfer of Technology Transactions" by Stanis-
law Soltysinski, in 196 Recueil des Cours 239 (1986-1) of
the Hague Academy of International Law.
Although its dean may find the term uncomfortable, "elite" prop-
erly describes the University of Pennsylvania Law School. A limited
student population, selected from the best college graduates in the coun-
try, is taught by an outstanding group of scholars, many of whom bring
to their teaching duties experience gained in other fields, in positions of
public service, and from other cultures, other times.
One of the most experienced of those teachers is Stanislaw
Soltysinski. In an active professional life, beginning with his first law
degree in 1961, Professor Soltysinski has studied at the London School
of Economics and Oxford and Columbia Universities, has served as a
professor and as dean of the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan,
Poland, and has taught at Penn. He has advised the Polish government
and numerous Polish foreign trade enterprises and ministries on the
"realities" of dealing with Western companies. He has also found time
to participate in UNCTAD conferences on international technology
transfer. Professor Soltysinski speaks and writes in English and Polish
with equal facility, and he can obviously rummage with full under-
standing through texts in German, French, and even Latin.
All of this impressive background has been brought to bear on the
preparation of his excellent monograph entitled "Choice of Law and
Choice of Forum in Transnational Transfer of Technology Transac-
tions." It is 140 pages of a scholar's well-documented research, a pro-
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fessor's well-organized lesson, an advocate's well-argued position paper,
and a man of the world's well-considered advice. Having had unique
opportunities to counsel businessmen and bureaucrats in Poland and
the United States, and to teach skeptical students in both countries,
Professor Soltysinski brings to his subject sensible insights and practical
suggestions. He also recognizes the importance to "his" Second World
of Socialist countries, no less than to the Third World of the lesser
developed countries (LDCs), of common sense applied to the glamorous
concept of transnational technology transfer transactions (the so-called
"4T's").
4T's conjure to governments, particularly in the LDCs, shortcuts
to development. To the Socialist countries they are seen as opportuni-
ties to catch up with Western material success. To aggressive business-
men in Osaka, 4T's are the deals to get ahead and stay ahead in The
Race for world technological hegemony. To the more tired folks in
Pittsburgh, 4T's promise return to market primacy or, at least, some
return from costs already sunk.
4T's are usually arranged, accomplished, and paid for pursuant to
contracts-legal documents-drafted by lawyers. Thus, it is natural to
assume that among the standard provisions of such documentation there
would be expressions of the parties' choice of a body of law to govern
their transactions (which, by definition, cross at least one border be-
tween two legal sovereigns) and of a forum in which that law would be
applied.
Professor Soltysinski's monograph accepts that assumption. Its the-
sis is, essentially, that a choice must be made, and that current theory
and practice in international law allow parties to make such choices.
However, the author posits, in the event that the selection of a gov-
erning law or forum is overlooked or inadequately specified, certain
principles based on the unique character of technology transactions
ought to be applied.
Indeed, Professor Soltysinski seems to argue for his principles of
choice even in the face of party selection of what he may regard as an
inappropriate law or forum. No less significant to these general points
is his ideological commitment to the notion that the "haves" of the
world owe a duty to the "have nots" to provide access to technology.
He acknowledges the apparent equal sovereignty of each nation. But
their unequal economic strength in approaching the bargaining table at
which a 4T is proposed for negotiation requires, in his scheme, some
tilts that favor transfer to the newcomer and reduce the power of the





Having myself practiced in the area of 4T's for close to thirty
years, I have much sympathy and understanding for many of Professor
Soltysinski's points. I, too, have come to marvel at the extent to which
the world's legal systems have increasingly permitted contracting par-
ties-particularly entirely "private" parties-to fashion for themselves
a real "law of the contract" that, to the extent it is created, recorded,
and not patently offensive to some "public law," is followed by the
parties in their relationship and enforced by courts and tribunals when
one or all parties no longer comply. It is fashionable to complain these
days about the over-regulation of many business transactions. And the
complainers are right. But it is still true that regulations intrude pri-
marily at the margins. The manufacturing of a product, the delivery of
a service, the sharing of information, the payment of a royalty or
purchase price-the heart, muscle and mind of a commercial transac-
tion-are provided in the form and at the time fashioned by the con-
tracting parties.
After World War II, the United States had the material goods and
intangible information the rest of the world wanted. United States in-
dustry commanders delegated to their lawyer lieutenants (as is much
more traditional in this country than anywhere else) the task of prepar-
ing the documents to transfer the hardware and the soft. English be-
came the language of all international commerce (how else does an Ital-
ian speak to a Japanese businessman?). And American styles of
lawyering and contracting became the world's standards. Those stan-
dards may be alien to newcomers to international transactions, but, to a
very considerable extent, all large commercial transactions, and particu-
larly 4T's-whether signed in Tokyo or Cleveland, Buenos Aires or
Frankfurt-will look similar, and be similar in form. Even when the
venue of the scenario moves to Warsaw or Nairobi, Beijing or Mexico
City, the papers will bear a striking resemblance to one another.
Nevertheless, no 4T of any significance can be closed by its par-
ticipants without at least some look at the welter of often very different
government-mandated considerations that may play a role in determin-
ing whether the transaction is viable (or dead on arrival). The parties
must consider, most importantly, the export controls on the technology
to be transferred, and their effect on the recipient's ability to market
what it makes with the data it bought. They must consider no less the
rules of the recipient's country, which can undermine the economics of
a deal through requirements for the use of local (possibly unsuitable)
managers, labor, parts, or distribution networks. They must review
rules specifying environmental or aesthetic criteria, historic preserva-
tion, worker safety, consumer protection, and scores of other "public
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order" concepts that governments everywhere now load on all the
world's commercial dealings in ever greater detail.
In courtly, professional prose, Professor Soltysinski urges all law-
yers drafting and executing a 4T contract "always [to] pay due atten-
tion to the nature and effects of non-observance of the formalities re-
quired by [such] lex loci protectionis" (p. 307). He has looked on this
scene through a scholar's eyes and has sought to find in the literature of
the law the principles that all parties to a 4T could accept to order
their relationships. In truth, to an American lawyer, the author's cita-
tion of numerous Latin maxims seems stuffy. (Eight different Latin
phrases are used within the two pages 282-83 alone; three newcomers
appear on the next two pages.) They are as unfamiliar as unnecessary
to persuade the reader of the Professor's erudition and good sense.
On the other hand, Soltysinski courageously calls a spade a spade
as he sees it. For example:
-He praises the extensive growth of the concept of
party autonomy in the legal systems of Western developed
countries, while noting that the idea fails to protect ade-
quately some legitimate interests of weaker parties in devel-
oping lands (p. 259);
-He sympathizes with the efforts of the developing
countries' governments to intrude in 4T negotiations; how-
ever, he aptly notes not only that their initiatives are an "as-
sault upon the central institution of modern private interna-
tional law" (i.e., party autonomy) (p. 263), but that the
results have often been the exact opposite of those sought:
"isolation of the market and the overall higher costs of ac-
quisition of technology" (p. 354);
-He shows how useless are the "modern" theories by
which a governing law is to be selected by reference to the
law of the jurisdiction of the party with the most "character-
istic obligation" or greatest contact to the performance (p.
315). 4T's are full of "characteristic obligations" by both
parties in at least two countries. And a typical 4T can in-
volve a patent licensor, an engineering company providing
process engineering, a company providing construction ser-
vices, another bringing start-up services and know-how, sup-
pliers of specialized equipment selling their unique items
and a licensee and its downstream affiliates that will process
the product made in the licensed facility. Each actor in this
configuration could be in or from a different country and




Based on what he says are his "empirical studies" of forty 4T's
involving Polish foreign trade organizations (p. 319), Soltysinski con-
cludes that the most appropriate law to govern such relationships is the
law of the place where the technology will be primarily used. These
concepts he would apply to know-how licenses no less than patent
agreements (p. 324), and to contracts for the provision of technical ser-
vices (p. 331).
Substantially less space is devoted to Soltysinski's review of choice-
of-forum clauses. He notes historic antipathy to party choices that
divest courts of the right to adjudicate disputes and the difficult prob-
lem raised by public laws that may be-at the least-unsuitable for
private (or foreign court) dispute resolution (p. 348). For example,
should a Polish court, even selected voluntarily by a U.S. patent licen-
sor, have jurisdiction to determine whether the licensor may properly
invoke its parallel German patent to prevent the Polish licensee from
selling licensed goods in the Federal Republic if the licensee believes
the German patent is invalid? And can that Polish court consider a
claim of the licensee that market-restricting clauses in its 4T contract
violate U.S. or E.C. competition rules?
Soltysinski also sketches the search for alternatives, and he rightly
observes that the identification of a "really neutral forum is a bit more
complex than advertised by the partisans of the cause of arbitration"
(p. 345) (emphasis in original). He is particularly doubtful that Swit-
zerland-often assumed to be a model neutral forum-can serve as a
proper impartial site for 4T dispute resolution in transactions between
Western and Socialist countries. Even "many United States fora" are
preferred (p. 346). But he concludes that arbitration and other forms of
alternative dispute resolution "should be encouraged . . . [as] the best
available forum to resolve controversies arising between parties from
disparate socio-economic systems" (p. 354). He extends this proposal
"to some extent" to public policy issues, such as antitrust law violations
(p. 355), but he does not stake the ground where his "extent" ends.
Mine extends to the limits of the parties' right to contract. I have
often thought it anomalous for a court to regard a patent license a law-
ful contract but to hold a private arbitrator's decision that a patent
needs to be respected (or may be disregarded) as an inappropriate in-
trusion into "public law." A patent is only a grant of a government to
the holder permitting the latter to bring legal proceedings to prevent
another person from exploiting the invention claimed in the patent. In
most countries the patentee need not use the patented invention during
the life of the patent and need not bring proceedings to prevent others
from doing so. The patentee, in effect, receives for the public disclosure
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of his invention a right that may or may not be exercised. If he is
permitted to enter into a private contract with another party, effectively
exchanging for a payment ("royalty") his monopoly right to exclude
the licensee, he ought also to be permitted-solely for the purposes of
their internal relationship-to rely on a private dispute resolution
mechanism. United States patent law has now adopted that view with
respect to U.S. patents. Moreover, just before the publication of Profes-
sor Soltysinski's monograph, the United States Supreme Court strongly
supported the notion of private arbitration even of antitrust claims
raised under "international contracts."'
1 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628-40 (1985) [hereinafter Mitsubishi]. Although this review was not to be encumbered
with footnotes, one such note may be of interest both to Professor Soltysinski and to
readers of this journal. It regards the rather special concern expressed by the United
States Department of Justice about the ability (or right) of private parties to settle a
dispute centered on U.S. parties' allegations that foreign competitors are "dumping" in
the American market. (Professor Soltysinski is himself an avid student of and commen-
tator on U.S. antidumping law, particularly as it affects countries such as his native
Poland. See, e.g., Soltysinski, The U.S. Import Relief Laws and Trade with Centrally
Planned Economies, 3 FLA. INT'L L. J. 59 (1987).)
The Antitrust Division of the Reagan Administration took a remarkably different
attitude towards most agreements between competitors, many of which would have
been regarded in previous administrations as per se violations of the antitrust laws,
particularly with regard to 4T's. See, e.g., the Department's rejection of the "prohibi-
tion" of "package licensing" in patent licenses-announced by the Supreme Court as
recently as 1969 in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135,
138 (1969)-in U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR IN-
TERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 66 n.257 (Final Version, November 10, 1988) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS]. These views go beyond the statutory reversal of the
Zenith holding (supported by the Department) enacted on November 19, 1988, as the
Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-703, 102 Stat. 4674, 4676 (codi-
fied at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (Supp. VI 1988)). Nevertheless, the Department states
that any agreement of U.S. petitioners to withdraw dumping claims on the basis of the
promise of a foreign competitor to raise export prices to the U.S. market (and thus stop
"dumping") would subject both the U.S. and foreign producers to action under the
antitrust laws. INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS at 48 n.221. But why do dumping cases
deserve such a special-hallowed-exemption from the notions that (a) most disputes
between private parties should be settled, and (b) a settlement that persuades a com-
plainant to withdraw its complaint is the most desirable way to achieve the purposes of
the law the complainant invoked?
As Soltysinski notes, the Supreme Court has approved withdrawals of litigation, in
favor of private settlements, based on claims of patent infringement or antitrust viola-
tions in international contract contexts (pp. 348-49) (referring to Mitsubishi). Why
treat dumping claims differently, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's "expo-
sure" of their questionable rationale? See Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-93 (1986). The Department's "policy" states
only-incorrectly-that "even if the Department would not challenge pricing as preda-
tory under the antitrust laws ... such pricing by foreign firms selling into the United
States may violate U.S. antidumping law. The purpose of the U.S. antidumping law is
different from the purpose of the antitrust laws . . . ." INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
at n.56 (emphasis added). In fact, foreign firms do not "violate" the antidumping law




But my extent reaches even further. I would allow and encourage
the parties fully to exercise their rulemaking rights and abilities at the
outset of their relationships, when the 4T is in the making. At that
juncture the parties have focused their minds on their objectives and
expectations, and they have invested their material and mental re-
sources in preparing a code of rules for their relationship. They should
be held to those rules. To the extent that what they have written down
in their contractual "constitution" is insufficiently precise or under-
standable, reference could be made to the usages of the trade in the
place where the party charged with a failure to act, or with a wrongful
act, committed its delict. That is the environment which that party can
properly be charged with knowing (while the "foreigner" to the 4T
may not). Finally, arbitrators (or mediators) may decide a dispute in
accordance with their views of what is just and equitable under the
circumstances. This "freedom" to determine justice and equity is not
intended to place into Solomon's hands a sword with which to cleave
the babe in two. It is intended to allow a decision maker to con-
sider-as a third order of priority, where the preceding two have been
inadequate-extra-contractual criteria useful in reaching a fair judg-
ment. Pre-eminent among those criteria can be, even should be, the law
of the place in which the performance of the contract was anticipated.
(And in defining "performance," I share Soltysinski's view that a pat-
ent and know-how license by a U.S. firm to a Polish licensee is primar-
ily "performed" in Poland, even though the licensor's inventions were
conceived and perfected in this country, all of the data to be delivered
are based on U.S. experience, written in English in the licensor's U.S.
offices, and the contract, in English, was negotiated and signed in New
York.)
The considerations supporting these views-now largely accepted
by the United States Supreme Court as well-are discussed in greater
detail in my article "Effective International Commercial Arbitration,"'
from which I have drawn the model arbitration clause for a 4T con-
tract appended here (with a few refinements based on ten years of
added experience and my recognition of many of the sensible points
explored so well in Soltysinski's monograph).
With international trade a rapidly expanding portion of the Amer-
ican economy, and 4T's a prominent feature of U.S. international com-
mercial dealing, the issues Professor Soltysinski defines and reviews
tidumping duties following proceedings which are almost always initiated by a domestic
competitor whose sole interest should be to avoid predatory behavior from competitors
abroad (or within the country).
2 9 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1191, 1225-26 (1977).
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take on added importance for every American lawyer. The Yearbooks
of the Academy of International Law are not easily found in American
law libraries. I can only hope that reprints in more accessible form will
make Soltysinski's valuable insights available to the many practitioners




(The following model arbitration clause is taken from a joint
venture agreement between an Italian company and a Japa-
nese company relating to their joint venture for marketing
the Japanese firm's products in Western Europe.)
Disputes
(1) Any and all disputes arising out of or in connection with the
negotiation, execution, interpretation, performance or nonperformance
of this Agreement (including, specifically, the validity, scope and en-
forceability of this arbitration agreement and any of the patents under
which rights have been or may be granted hereunder) shall be solely
and finally settled by arbitration, which shall be conducted where best
suited for the resolution of the dispute in light of the convenience of the
parties and their documents and witnesses, or, failing agreement on
such place, in [Amsterdam, Holland] by a single arbitrator selected by
the parties. The arbitrator shall be a lawyer familiar with international
business transactions, conversant in English, and not a national of [Ja-
pan] or [Italy]. The parties specifically agree to renounce all recourse to
litigation and that the award of the arbitrator shall be final and subject
to no judicial review. The arbitrator shall conduct the proceedings in
the English language, and pursuant to the then-existing Rules of the
International Chamber of Commerce. If the parties fail to agree on the
arbitrator within 30 days of the date one of them invokes this arbitra-
tion agreement, either may apply to the Court of Arbitration of the
International Chamber of Commerce or to an appropriate court in [the
Netherlands] to make the appointment. The arbitrator shall be bound
by no substantive law, and shall decide in descending order of priority
in accordance with: (a) the language of this Agreement; (b) the usages
and customs of the trade in the country of the party claimed to be re-
sponsible for taking or failing to take action; and (c) what is just and
equitable under the circumstances, in which connection the arbitrator
may take into account the law of the country applicable to the perform-
ance of the Agreement.
(2) The parties agree to facilitate the arbitration by: (a) making
available to one another and to the arbitrator for inspection and extrac-
tion all documents, books, records and personnel under their control or
controlling such party if determined by the arbitrator to be relevant to
the dispute; (b) conducting arbitration hearings to the greatest extent
possible on successive, contiguous days; and (c) observing strictly the
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time periods established by the Rules or by the arbitrator for the sub-
mission of evidence and of briefs.
(3) Any Party may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction for
injunctive relief or other interim measures in aid of the arbitration pro-
ceedings, but not otherwise.
(4) Judgment on the award of the arbitrator may be entered in
any court having jurisdiction over the parties or their assets. The arbi-
trator shall divide all costs (other than fees of counsel) incurred in con-
ducting the arbitration in his final award in accordance with what he
deems just and equitable under the circumstances.
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